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Focused Discussion Invited Paper
Feyerabendian Pragmatism
Jeffrey Foss*
In the not-too-distant future the scientific realism debate will be absorbed
into the far more ancient-and-venerable, old-and-unqualified, realism debate.
The first efficient mover of this absorption will be the fact that scientific
ontology is a growing and very mixed bag, including not just rocks,
plants, animals, and stars, but the Higgs boson, the Big Bang, evolutionary
pressures, teenage anxieties, economic growth, social trends, countries,
industrial toxins, and hedge funds. Trying to hedge off these ever-stranger
newcomers by such moves as castling the debate within well- (or best-)
established, mature (two decades old? five?), basic physics is to submit to a
biased umpire, with a narrow strike-zone, to get to an arbitrary first base.
The large-scale conceptual migrations underlying this future change
include increasing diversification (as opposed to unification) of the sciences
into new fields (cosmology, computation, consciousness, climate) with strange
realities, entailing increasingly well-established internal tensions among
practising scientists (gradualism versus punctuated equilibrium, Copenhagen
interpretation versus quantum realism, CO2 warming versus solar-driven
variability, etc.), and ever more integration of scientific theories into different
domains of popular culture. Lo! The time is upon us when we (self-identified)
philosophers really should respond to the question, “Are you a scientific
realist” with the question, “Which bit of science do you have in mind?”
In retrospect we will see, and even now we can see, that philosophical
answers to the question of scientific realism are treating the word “real”
as an honorific title. The everyday scientific realist is saying something
like, “Science is just so cool (epistemically and metaphysically speaking)
that I believe what it says,” while the scientific hyper-realist (such as Paul
Churchland) bombastically adds, “and only what it says.” The everyday
scientific anti-realist doesn’t think science is all that cool, and thus denies
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that everything science talks about is real, although which part of science
(and its ontology) s/he rejects varies. Since physics writes what it and all
orthodox scientists take to be the foundational ontology for all of science,
the ontological focus is on it—but it is not nearly as clear, sturdy, steady,
or near-fetched these days as it was in Newton’s heady times. To paraphrase
the poet, this new, solid physical stuff can “melt, thaw, and resolve itself into
a dew”—albeit a dew of black holes—or some even stranger quasi-substance
that physics will come up with tomorrow. Black holes are but one magical
stuff of new physical theory (or physical ideology as Feyerabend sees it),
and I sympathize with ontologists who pick and choose within its bestiary.
Bas van Fraassen famously suggests we needn’t go there at all, as accepting
a theory only requires believing that the perceptible (visible, audible, etc.)
things it refers to exist—so light exists but retinal cells, awkwardly, might
not.
In the future we will see that there has been all along a very personally
pragmatic thread to the scientific realism debate: a philosopher dubs “real”
the entities postulated in scientific theories (or hypotheses) only if they
satisfy the ontological intuitions underlying her/his ontological leanings. All
the while, the reality of philosophers, their theories, and the journals they
publish them in are merely presupposed without question—along with the
metabolic chemistry of those who toil in the philosophical and publishing
professions. A richer, more Feyerabendian, ontology than that which is
professed is unconsciously presupposed by many an ontologist.
Like C.S. Peirce, I think that we must look at a person’s whole behavior
to see what she or he really believes, not just the verbal bit of it. Like my
philosophical grandfather, I believe that real belief (versus expressions of
belief) guides behaviour. That’s its biological function. What you believe is
what you act on and live by. It is a working part of the info-bio-mechanism
you are. Professed beliefs are more often restricted to verbal behaviour alone.
First, to say that “real” is an honorific expresses the pragmatic core of
my ontology. In terms Wilfred Sellars and both Churchlands might, I hope,
like: when I accept a model (scientific or otherwise) that really matters to
how I act and live, then I grant (whether explicitly or implicitly, consciously
or unconsciously) reality to the things of that model. I honor what really
matters to me by treating it as real. Put epigrammatically:
The Real = All That Really Matters.
Secondly, I accept as true Paul Feyerabend’s postulation of the
“Abundance of Nature,” which I (perhaps mis-) understand as follows:
the world (reality as a whole) contains such an abundance of things that
we are generally able to find bodies of evidence in favour of almost any
theory we may dream up. Peoples have thrived believing the craziest, wildest
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things. When it comes to professional knowledge, i.e., science, there has been
abundant evidence for every model that ever got into the major leagues,
including those that have long since been smashingly falsified, like Newton’s
mechanics, Ptolemy’s astronomy, and ancient flat-Earth geography.
But—and this is a history those who cleave to the “mature science” form
of realism do not want to learn from—the flow of humanly accessible evidence
is anything but monotonic. The evidence for any model, including Ptolemy’s
and Newton’s, may together form a living, growing body for centuries, and
seem immortal, but eventually cancerous falsifications appear. Conversely,
the sun-centered universes of Philolaus and Aristarchus can lie as dead
as a Norwegian Blue parrot for centuries only to have life breathed back
into them by sky-gazers like Copernicus, telescope-makers like Galileo, and
model-spinners like Newton.
I believe this is inevitable for the following Feyerabendian reason: there
is more in the world (the Abundance of Nature) than can be captured in any
representation, model, map, theory, mind, brain, or philosophy. Much must
be left out. Leaving the right (i.e., the messy, murky, troublesome) stuff out
is the first decision of any successful modeller. So the unexplainable always
comes knocking for any theory, ideology, mapping, or representation—no
matter how high-born or well-born or obvious. Even the impossible may
turn up—and grumpily refuse to go away (e.g., the Earth moves, or vanishes
by gravitational collapse).
As for scientific realism, my Feyerabendian Pragmatism brand of ontology
says that bacteria, viruses, molecules, atoms, electrons, and electromagnetic
forces are real because they really matter to me (just as much as do dismissive
philosophical reviews). Those who work with such scientific things (not the
reviews) created the computer on which I write this essay, and since this essay
is real, those scientific things on which both computer and essay depend must
have significant reality as well.
On the other hand, my pragmatism, schooled by William James, requires
that my beliefs be seen as having different sorts and degrees of reliability.
I trust my roadmap to get me where I am travelling, but not to reveal the
detailed shape of a river or the real colour of its water. I place more confidence,
generally speaking, in my manifest model,1 my sensory representation of the
world, wherein my perceptions and my theory of everyday objects cohere,
than I place in the scarcely visible and generally less relevant postulates of
science. I am more confident in the reality of plants, animals, and inanimate
objects than I am in the atoms of which I believe (less confidently) they
are made. When it comes to explicating the different sorts and degrees of
1 I develop this idea of Wilfred Sellars a bit more in Foss (2000)—in ways I hope he would
like. See especially Ch. 2.
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reliability among my beliefs, there is little by way of sweeping principle
and much by way of homely, boring qualifications, details, provisos, and
the uncounted devils among the details.
I do not believe there exist different degrees of reality, but I do believe
there are different sorts of entities. Living things, for instance, are really
different from nonliving things. How many sorts of entities? I see no best
way to count them, indeed no practical way to count them at all (i.e., there
is, practically speaking, an uncountable abundance of kinds of things)—and
I leave the business of ordering the whole dang shooting match to more
ambitious ontologists than me. But, for what it’s worth, I believe that
last-minute corrections are just as real as dogs. I think that hunger and satiety
are just as real as food, even though what counts as food is species-specific
(hay for the ass, bread for me, etc.), hence that different species experience
different realities (all of which have a place in the whole). Venturing beyond
science into ordinary language, rainbows are real, though they clearly are not
physical objects, but visual phenomena. Like colours, they are phenomena
that exist by virtue of that part of my nervous system that informs me of the
world that is present to me in both time and space. I’m still not clear whether
van Fraassen sees rainbows as real. Speaking of whom, I dare venture even
into the domain of logic by believing my decision to write this essay was real,
though the decision I might have made not to write it was never real, though
it might have been. Who could fail to agree—if not too bored to read.
Finally, I speculate that this ever-creative, constantly-evolving,
endlessly-happening universe comprises a specific ontological unity at any
one time and over all of time. That’s what my total experience so far leads
me to think, though I must in honesty hasten to add that even if this is really
true, I will never have a way of proving it, not even to myself, much less to
others. Even if there is only one world, there are indefinitely many ways
of experiencing it and knowing it. The abundant font of reality constantly
overflows our primitive vessels of epistemological containment. There is more
to it than meets the eye, or all the eyes, microscopes, telescopes, cameras,
Broca-readers,2 and so on that will ever exist.
Jeffrey Foss
University of Victoria
P.O. Box 3045 STN CSC
Victoria, BC V8W 3P4
2 The Broca-reader is a science-fictional device I devised as a Dennett-ian intuition-pump
in Foss (1995). A Broca-reader reveals to scientific observation the purely verbal aspects
of our private consciousness, those things we say “in our hearts,” to ourselves alone, in
a specific language, with specific words.
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